

(4 cry, hysterically, at thought
of my "scent," or of Aug 6, 45;
(was this intensified on Aug 4, 1946?
leading to release of PP...?)

4 Feb 83

me, on hst:

- Notions that "hst was unstoppable - esp. by hst,
so soon an army officer, so late in process" -
may be true: but misses an important lesson
about our leaders, of whom hst was typical - at
least, of the strat. leading practice of 1944-45:

- hst would almost surely have chosen to drop both
bombs even if the lead had been stoppable;

he had 4 or 5 reasons, any of which he (th)
thought sufficient: NONE OF WHICH WERE (in my,
or many, eyes)
^{my or}
after late Jan, 1945.

- there did not include, "to avert invasion, save
1 million lives" (as public was led to believe was both
the actual motive and a necessary motive).

- 2) - the dieb ichell: causing a Japanese surrender before or as soon after August 8 as possible - to minimize Russian participation in the East war, claim to role in surrender & occupation of Japan.

(They, 2d bomb was not "unnecessary," and "could not" be delayed.)

- e) - probably also: to test ~~and demonstrate~~ P_{239} - explosion bomb on people.

(not to US public: that's why, this - and / need to explain all this)

- b) - to test and demonstrate - to show - the impact and of throw a bomb, and Pres' willingness to drop it for 'small' notice - before the war ended (e.g., because of SC entry on Aug. 8-9 !)

(b) and (c)

(Once all of these had been achieved, same after Nagasaki, 8st dieb cancel 3d bomb - on basis of revelation, which was strong enough to economize use of bombs to 2, including P_2 .

(Why not wait for P_2 ? Because of (b).